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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
CA, INC. and AVAGO
TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL
SALES PTE. LIMITED,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NETFLIX, INC.,
Defendant.
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Case No. 2:21-cv-00080-JRG-RSP

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Defendant Netflix, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue, or in
the Alternative, Transfer to the Northern District of California. Dkt. No. 26. Defendant’s Motion
asks the Court to dismiss the above-captioned matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) or,
alternatively, to transfer this case to the Northern District of California under § 1404(a).
I.

BACKGROUND

On March 9, 2021, Plaintiffs CA, Inc. and Avago Technologies International Sales Pte.
Limited (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed their complaint against Defendant in this District. Dkt.
No. 1. The Court granted two unopposed applications for extension of time for Defendant to
respond to the complaint. Dkt. No. 11; Dkt. No. 12. On May 14, 2021, Defendant filed an action
for declaratory judgment of non-infringement of these patents. See Netflix, Inc. v. CA, Inc. et al.,
No. 3:21-cv-03649-EMC (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2021). On May 17, 2021, Defendant filed the present
motion. Dkt. No. 26.
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II.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Venue

In matters unique to patent law, Federal Circuit law rather than regional circuit law applies.
In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan
Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is unique to patent law
and “constitute[s] ‘the exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement proceedings’
. . . .” Id. (citing TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S.Ct. 1514, 1518
(2017) (quoting Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 563 (1942))).
Venue is proper for patent infringement suits “where the defendant resides, or where the
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). For § 1400(b) venue by residence, a domestic corporation resides only in its
state of incorporation. TC Heartland LLC, 137 S.Ct. at 1520. For § 1400(b) venue by a regular and
established place of business, “(1) there must be a physical place in the district; (2) it must be a
regular and established place of business; and (3) it must be the place of the defendant.” In re Cray
Inc., 871 F.3d at 1360. “Where a complaint alleges infringement, the allegations ‘satisfy the ‘acts
of infringement’ requirement of § 1400(b) ‘[a]lthough the[] allegations may be contested.’” Seven
Networks, LLC v. Google LLC, 315 F. Supp. 3d 933, 942 (E.D. Tex. 2017) (quoting Symbology
Innovations, LLC v. Lego Sys., Inc., 282 F.Supp.3d 916, 928 (E.D. Va. 2017)).
A “place of business” does not require “real property ownership or a leasehold interest in
real property” and “leased shelf space or rack space can serve as a ‘place’ under the statute.” In re
Google LLC, 949 F.3d 1338, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2020). A “place of business” generally requires
an employee or agent of the defendant to conduct business at that place. Id. at 1344. The “agent or
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employee” need not be “a human agent” and the Court left open the question of whether a machine
may be an agent. Id. at 1347.
The Federal Circuit has held that a place of business is “of the defendant,” if it is established
or ratified by the defendant. Id. at 1363. A place may be “of the defendant” even if the defendant
does not own or lease the place if the defendant exercises other attributes of possession or control
over the place and “the statute could be satisfied by any physical place that the defendant could
‘possess[] or control.’” In re Google LLC, 949 F.3d at 1343. This requirement is satisfied if the
defendant “actually engage[s]” in business from the physical location in the District. Intellectual
Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp., No. 2:16-cv-00980-JRG, 2017 WL 5630023, at *7 (E.D. Tex.
Nov. 22, 2017).
A party may move to dismiss an action for “improper venue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3).
“Once a defendant raises a 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for improper venue, the burden of sustaining
venue lies with the plaintiff.” ATEN Int'l Co. v. Emine Tech. Co., 261 F.R.D. 112, 120–21 (E.D.
Tex. 2009) (citing Laserdynamics Inc. v. Acer Am. Corp., 209 F.R.D. 388, 390 (S.D.Tex. 2002).
A plaintiff may carry its burden by presenting facts, taken as true, that establish venue. Id.
The Court “must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and resolve all conflicts in favor of
the plaintiff.” Mayfield v. Sallyport Glob. Holdings, Inc., No. 6:13-CV-459, 2014 WL 978685, at
*1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2014) (citing Ambraco, Inc. v. Bossclip, B.V., 570 F.3d 233, 237–38 (5th
Cir. 2009)).
“[V]enue facts are to be examined as of the date the suit is filed.” Personal Audio, LLC v.
Google, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 922, 924 (E.D. Tex. 2017). The Federal Circuit has emphasized that
“each case depends on its own facts” and “no one fact is controlling.” In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d at
1362, 1366. If venue is improper, the Court must dismiss it, “or if it be in the interest of justice,
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transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. §
1406(a).
B. Agency
“An agency relationship is a ‘fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a
‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s
behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents
to act.” In re Google LLC, 949 F.3d at 1345 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01). “The
essential elements of agency are (1) the principal’s ‘right to direct or control’ the agent’s actions,
(2) ‘the manifestation of consent by [the principal] to [the agent] that the [agent] shall act on his
behalf,” and (3) the ‘consent by the [agent] to act.’” Id. (citing Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 286
(2003)).
Regarding machines as agents, the Federal Circuit has found that an ISP that provides a
party with a service wherein that party has “no right of interim control over the ISP’s provision of
network access,” performs one-time installations, and performs “basic maintenance activities” is
not an agent of said party. In re Google LLC, 949 F.3d at 1346. Further, “as [the Federal Circuit]
noted in Cray, the Supreme Court has cautioned against a broad reading of the venue statute.” Id.
(internal citations omitted). “The venue statute should be read to exclude agents’ activities, such
as maintenance, that are merely connected to, but do not themselves constitute, the defendant's
conduct of business in the sense of production, storage, transport, and exchange of goods or
services.” Id.
C. Transfer
“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to
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any district or division to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). It is the movant’s
burden to prove that the transferee venue is “clearly more convenient” than the transferor venue.
In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen the transferee
venue is not clearly more convenient than the venue chosen by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's choice
should be respected. When the movant demonstrates that the transferee venue is clearly more
convenient, however, it has shown good cause and the district court should therefore grant the
transfer.”)
The § 1404 convenience factors include private-interest factors and public-interest factors.
In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d at 315. The private-interest factors include “(1) the
relative ease of access to sources of proof, (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. The public-interest
factors include: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local
interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law
that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws.” Id.
III.

ANALYSIS

Venue is proper for patent infringement suits “where the defendant resides, or where the
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). For § 1400(b) venue by residence, a domestic corporation resides only in its
state of incorporation. TC Heartland LLC, 137 S.Ct. at 1520. There is no dispute that Defendant
is a Delaware corporation that maintains its principal place of business at 100 Winchester Circle,
Los Gatos, California 95032. Dkt. No. 26 at 12; Dkt. No. 1 at 2. Accordingly, Defendant does not
reside in the Eastern District of Texas.
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Whether Defendant has a regular and established place of business is disputed. For §
1400(b) venue by a regular and established place of business, “(1) there must be a physical place
in the district; (2) it must be a regular and established place of business; and (3) it must be the
place of the defendant.” In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d at 1360.
Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that venue is proper because Defendant has committed
acts of infringement in this District and has a regular and established place of business in this
District. Dkt. No. 1 at 3. Plaintiffs then allege as follows: Defendant uses a content delivery
network called “Open Connect” to deliver Defendant’s content to its subscribers worldwide,
including in this District. Id. The building blocks of Open Connect are custom Netflix servers that
store Netflix video content called “Open Connect Appliances” (“OCAs”). Id. Defendant installs
OCAs in significant Netflix markets throughout the world to localize its video content by providing
OCAs directly to local internet service providers (“ISPs”). Id. Defendant provides the server
hardware and the ISPs provide power, space, and connectivity. Id. at 3–4. Defendant contracts
with ISPs and installs OCAs with those ISPs in physical facilities in this District and Defendant
retains control of its OCAs “by monitoring, updating, and maintaining the OCA, as well as
supplying it with specific video content.” Id. at 4–5.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s ISP partners in this District act as Defendant’s agents
because Defendant “for example, requires its ISP partners to ‘identify a person or a set of people
who are available to perform’ specific business roles for Defendant at the ISP facility to ‘facilitate
the overall process’ of delivering streaming video to Netflix customers.” Id. at 5. Plaintiffs allege
that Defendant’s OCA Deployment Guide explains that “the manner in which traffic is directed to
the appliance is determined explicitly by you [i.e., the ISP] and Netflix, not by the appliance itself.”
Id.

(citing

https://openconnect.netflix.com/deploymentguide.pdf).
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Defendant’s OCAs, which are in physical facilities in this District and deliver cached content to
residents in this District, are regular and established places of business of Defendant.
Defendant argues that it gives its server hardware to ISPs who may install and use that
hardware to speed up the delivery of Netflix content to the ISP’s customers. Dkt. No. 26 at 8 (citing
Dkt. Nos. 26-4, 26-6, 26-8, 26-10, and 26-12). Defendant asserts it then enters into software license
agreements with the ISPs who accept the hardware that Netflix transfers to them. Id. (citing Dkt.
No. 26-5). Defendant contends the software license agreements grant ISPs the right to use Netflix’s
software and defines the combination of Netflix’s software and the transferred server as an
“Appliance.” Id. (Citing Dkt. No. 26-5).
A. Cray Factors
Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs fail to allege any “physical place” owned or controlled by
Netflix in this District. Dkt. No. 26 at 13. Defendants argue that Netflix neither owns nor leases
real estate here, and that the hardware appliances housed by the ISP are not owned by Defendant
as Defendant “irrevocably transfers ownership, title and control of the hardware appliance” to the
ISP. Id. (citing Dkt. Nos. 26-4, 26-6, 26-8, 26-10, and 26-12).
Defendant argues that even if Defendant owned the hardware appliances, they could not
establish a “regular and established place of business” here. Id. (citing In re Google LLC, 949 F.3d
at 1343–45). Defendant contends that Plaintiffs recycle a theory rejected by the Federal Circuit.
Id. at 14. Defendant does not dispute that the ISPs are located in the Eastern District of Texas, but
rather argues that the ISPs are not Defendant’s agents. Id. at 14–17. Defendant further contends
that no ISP’s facility is a place “of Netflix” because Defendant has no rights to any physical space
in any of the ISP’s locations. Dkt. No. 26 at 13.
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Plaintiffs respond that Defendant’s motion does not challenge CA’s allegations that (1)
Defendant has committed acts of infringement in this District; (2) Defendant conducts a regularand-established business in this District by streaming video content to subscribers in this District;
(3) the OCA servers that Netflix uses to deliver streaming video content to subscribers in this
District are located in physical facilities in this District, and (4) the OCA servers are places of
business. Dkt. No. 51 at 9–10. Plaintiffs contend Defendant’s venue challenge centers on two
arguments: that venue is improper because Defendant does not “own” the OCA servers and
because the ISPs are not acting as Defendant’s agents. Id. at 10.
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs’ characterization of Defendant’s argument. See Dkt. No.
57 at 3 (“Plaintiffs argue that there are two bases for venue over Netflix in this District: (1) ‘[t]he
OCA servers are Netflix’s places of business,’ and (2) the Internet Service Providers with whom
Netflix contracts for services in this District ‘act as Netflix’s agents.’ Both bases for venue have
been squarely rejected by the Federal Circuit.”). Although venue here is determined by the Cray
factors, the Cray factors in turn are determined in this instance by the facts surrounding the OCAs
and their use as well as whether an agency relationship exists between Defendant and local ISPs.
B. OCA Possession and Control
Defendant argues that the OCAs are not a “physical place” “of Defendant” because
Defendant “irrevocably transfers ownership, title and control of the hardware appliance” to the
ISP. Dkt. No. 26 at 13. Plaintiffs respond that the question is not whether the Defendant “owns”
the place at issue, but rather that the statute can be satisfied by any physical place that the defendant
could “possess or control.” Dkt. No. 51 at 10 (citing In re Google LLC, 949 F.3d at 1343 (quoting
In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d at 1363)).
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The Federal Circuit in In re Google made clear that “Cray itself recognized that a ‘place of
business’ is not restricted to real property that the defendant must ‘own[] or lease,’ and that the
statute could be satisfied by any physical place that the defendant could ‘possess[] or control.’” In
re Google LLC, 949 F.3d at 1343 (quoting In re Cray Inc. at 1363). “For example, a defendant
who operates a table at a flea market may have established a place of business; the table serves as
a ‘physical, geographical location . . . from which the business of the defendant is carried out.’”
Id. (citing In re Cray Inc. at 1362; In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 735, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
“Similarly, leased shelf space or rack space can serve as a ‘place’ under the statute, as two
district courts have found.” Id. at 1343–44 (citing Tinnus Enters., LLC v. Telebrands Corp., No.
6:17-CV-00170, 2018 WL 4560742, at 4*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79068, at *14 (E.D. Tex. Mar.
9, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4524119, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78342
(E.D. Tex. May 1, 2018) (holding that “premium shelf space” leased by the defendant constituted
a regular and established place of business); Peerless Network, Inc. v. Blitz Telecom Consulting,
LLC, No. 17-CV-1725, 2018 WL 1478047, at *3, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49628, at *8–9 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 26, 2018) (holding that shelf space constituted a “place” under the first factor of
the Cray test)). “Relevant considerations include whether the defendant owns or leases the place,
or exercises other attributes of possession or control over the place. . . . Marketing or advertisement
also may be relevant, but only to the extend they indicate that the defendant itself holds out a place
for its business.” In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d at 1363.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant both controls the OCA servers and promotes them as
Netflix’s OCAs, each of which may make the OCAs and their locations places of Netflix under
the statute. Dkt. No. 51 at 11. Plaintiffs contend that although Defendant grants ISPs title to the
OCA servers, such transfer of title is illusory as Defendant retains ownership of all the software
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Defendant preloads onto the OCAs before shipment to the ISPs, merely granting the ISP a license
to use that software to carry out Defendant’s video-streaming business. Id.
Plaintiffs argue convincingly that “Netflix’s contention that the ISPs own the servers
appears to be a legal fiction. Id. at n. 9. Plaintiffs contend Netflix instructs its ISP partners that
they “should not attempt to modify, upgrade, or repair the appliance.” Id. (citing Dkt. Nos. 51-3;
51-9). Plaintiffs assert that when an ISP has a defective OCA and sends it back to Defendant,
Defendant attempts to repair it and put it “back into the pool of available service for redistribution
to the partners,” but not necessarily back to the same ISP, raising the very real question of whether
the ISP actually owns the OCA if Netflix can just redirect it to a different ISP. Id. (citing Dkt. No.
51-9 at 90–91). 1
Plaintiffs further contend that, according to Defendant’s Open Connect Deployment Guide,
“Netflix continuously monitors all deployed Netflix OCAs, including all aspects of the
performance and availability of the appliance,” that “[a]fter we [Netflix] deploy OCAs to a site,
we constantly measure and analyze their performance and augment capacity as requirements
evolve,” and “[a]ll of our OCA deployments, whether in IXPs or embedded in ISP networks, are
constantly monitored by the Open Connect Operations team to ensure reliability and efficiency.”
Id. at 11–12 (quoting Dkt. No. 51-2 at 33; Dkt. No. 51-1 at 3, 5; Dkt. No. 51-9 at 75).
Plaintiffs argue that in addition to the control Defendant exerts over the OCAs, Defendant
also maintains tight control over how ISP partners use the OCAs with an Open Connect
Deployment Guide (Dkt. No. 51-2) which indicates the requirements for certain physical
connections for the OCAs, network capacity, temperature at which ISPs must keep their facilities,

In light of economic realities and the control maintained by Netflix in the surrounding contractual language, it
strikes the Court as disingenuous for Netflix to contend that “the ISPs take title to the servers, and they are free to
use them as OCAs or as they otherwise see fit.” Dkt. No. 57 at 4.

1

10

Case 2:21-cv-00080-JRG-RSP Document 110 Filed 09/27/21 Page 11 of 34 PageID #: 2325

the direction OCAs once installed must face, the manner of inbound and outbound filtering ISPs
are permitted to use for the OCAs, how they are configured, the circumstances the OCAs may be
relocated one installed, and whether ISPs may keep components of the OCAs they purportedly
own. Id. at 12–13. Further, Plaintiffs assert that Netflix’s corporate representative confirmed that
Netflix can wipe the software from an OCA remotely. Id. at 13 (citing Dkt. No. 51-10 at 101:13–
16 (“Q Does Netflix have the ability to wipe the software from an OCA remotely? A Yes.”)).
Plaintiffs further argue that, in addition to Defendant’s possession and control over the
OCAs and tight control over how ISP partners use the OCAs, Defendant ratifies the OCA servers
as its own places of business by holding out the OCAs as such by consistently referring to them in
marketing materials and other public statements as “Netflix OCAs” and “our OCAs.” Id. at 14–15
(citing Dkt. Nos. 51-11, 51-5, 51-12, 51-13, and 51-2). Plaintiffs assert that Netflix represents to
customers that Netflix’s distributed-server network, composed of Netflix OCAs housed within
local ISPs, is a critical part of its business and even specifically touts its OCAs in the Eastern
District of Texas by highlighting ISPs in the District and explaining that “[t]his map of our network
gives you a sense for how much this effort has scaled in the last five years.” Id. at 15 (citing Dkt.
No. 51-6)
Plaintiffs contend that Defendant’s own filings in this District acknowledge that the OCAs
are “Netflix Servers,” quoting Defendant in City of New Boston v. Netflix, Inc.:
Netflix’s customers, using their own personal devices, connect to
the Internet through their ISP and send requests to Netflix for
particular pieces of content. The subscriber’s ISP then relays that
request to a Netflix Server, and Netflix delivers that content to the
subscriber’s ISP, which is responsible for delivering it to its
customer’s device.
Id. (quoting City of New Boston v. Netflix, Inc., No. 5:20-cv-00135-RWS, Dkt. No. 10 (E.D. Tex.
Oct. 2, 2020)).
11
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Defendant does not challenge any of these factual representations by Plaintiffs in its reply.
Defendant rather argues that In re Google establishes that for venue there must be “the regular,
physical presence of an employee or other agent of the defendant conducting the defendant’s
business at the alleged ‘place of business,’ and asserts that none of Defendant’s employees have a
regular, physical presence at the OCA servers located in this District and contends that local ISPs
are not Netflix’s agents. Dkt. No. 57 at 3–4 (quoting In re Google LLC, 949 F.3d at 1345).
Given these unchallenged factual assertions by Plaintiff, it is clear that Defendant maintains
a great deal of control over the OCAs. Although Defendant asserts it “irrevocably transfers
ownership, title and control of the hardware appliance” to the ISP on paper, in practice Defendant
retains control by continuously monitoring, updating, and maintaining the OCA. See Dkt. No. 26
at 13; see also Dkt. No. 1 at 4–5. Most notably, Defendant’s ability to remotely delete software
and even redistribute the hardware itself reveals that Defendant has sufficient possession and
control over the OCAs for venue purposes. See Dkt. No. 51-10 at 101:13–16; see also Dkt. No.
51-9 at 90–91. Finally, Defendant’s consistent reference to the OCAs as belonging to Defendant
in its marketing materials is sufficient to ratify the OCAs as Defendant’s place of business. See
Dkt. Nos. 51-2, 51-5, 51-11, 51-12, and 51-13.
Defendant is correct that this possession and control, alone, are not sufficient to establish
the OCAs are regular and established places of business of Defendant in the District. Plaintiffs do
not challenge Defendant’s assertion that Defendant has no employees where the OCAs are
installed. See Dkt. No. 57 at 4. With the finding that Defendant has sufficient possession and
control over the OCAs and ratifies them as its places of business, the remaining legal issue for the
proper venue analysis is whether the ISPs act as agents of Defendant.
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C. Agency
“The essential elements of agency are (1) the principal’s ‘right to direct or control’ the
agent’s actions, (2) ‘the manifestation of consent by [the principal] to [the agent] that the [agent]
shall act on his behalf,” and (3) the ‘consent by the [agent] to act.’” Id. (citing Meyer, 537 U.S. at
286). The Federal Circuit has found that an ISP that provides a party with a service wherein that
party has “no right of interim control over the ISP’s provision of network access,” performs onetime installations, and performs “basic maintenance activities” is not an agent of that party. In re
Google LLC, 949 F.3d at 1346. Further, “as [the Federal Circuit] noted in Cray, the Supreme Court
has cautioned against a broad reading of the venue statute.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “The
venue statute should be read to exclude agents’ activities, such as maintenance, that are merely
connected to, but do not themselves constitute, the defendant's conduct of business in the sense of
production, storage, transport, and exchange of goods or services.” Id.
Defendant asserts that the present case is like In re Google, where the Federal Circuit
rejected venue based on the theory that the ISPs in that case were Google’s agents. Dkt. No. 26 at
14. In In re Google, the allegation of venue was based on the presence of Google Global Cache
(“GGC”) servers, which function as local caches for Google’s data. In re Google LLC, 949 F.3d
at 1340. Defendant argues that even with (1) contracts with the ISPs regulating the use of the GGC
servers by (a) tightly restricting ISP’s ability to relocate the servers, (b) limiting unauthorized
access to the space used by Google’s servers, and (c) forbidding the ISPs to access, use, or dispose
of the GGC servers without Google’s permission; (2) provision of a connection to the ISP’s
customers and the public internet; and (3) installation by ISPs, the Federal Circuit did not find an
agency relationship. Dkt. No. 26 at 14–15.
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Defendant argues that “to the extent there are any differences between the relevant venue
facts in Google and the venue allegations here, the allegations are baseless and unsupported by the
documents [Plaintiff] cites. For example, [Plaintiff] alleges that Netflix installs the OCAs, but
nothing [Plaintiff] cites in its Complaint supports such an allegation.” Dkt. No. 26 at 16. Defendant
then proceeds to argue that there are differences in the contracts, and the contracts give Defendant
less control than Google had. Id.
“[M]aintenance activities cannot, standing alone, be considered the conduct of Google’s
business”—which is “providing video and advertising services to residents of the Eastern District
of Texas through the Internet.” In re Google LLC, 949 F.3d at 1340, 1346. Instead, “[m]aintaining
equipment is meaningfully different from—as only ancillary to—the actual producing, storing,
and furnishing to customers of what the business offers.” Id. at 1346.
Plaintiffs respond that In re Google does not support Defendant’s argument. Dkt. No. 51
at 16. Plaintiffs argue that the Federal Circuit held that “Google lacked a ‘regular and established
place of business’ within the district since it has no employee or agent regularly conducting its
business at its alleged ‘place of business’ within the district.” Id. (quoting In re Google LLC, 949
F.3d at 1347). Plaintiffs contend that In re Google did not hold that ISPs may never be agents for
venue purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), but rather that “under the facts of that case, ISPs that
simply installed and performed routine maintenance on Google’s servers were not acting as
Google’s agents in the conduct of Google’s business.” Id.
The Federal Circuit in In re Google found that although the ISP provided the GGC servers
with network access, “Google has no right of interim control over the ISP’s provision of network
access beyond requiring that the ISP maintain network access to the GGC servers and allow the
GGC servers to use certain ports for inbound and outbound network traffic.” In re Google LLC,
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949 F.3d at 1345. The Federal Circuit explained, “the ISP performs installation of the GGC servers.
The contracts with the ISPs stated that the ISP was responsible for the installation . . .” but that
“[a]lthough these provisions may be suggestive of an agency relationship . . . . [t]he installation
activity does not constitute the conduct of a “regular and established” business, since it is a onetime event for each server.” Id. at 1346. The Federal Circuit continued: “the contracts provide that
‘Google may from time to time request that [the ISP] perform certain services’ involving ‘basic
maintenance activities’ . . .” and “[a]lthough the maintenance provision, like the provision on
installation, may be suggestive of an agency relationship . . . . the maintenance activities cannot,
alone, be considered the conduct of Google’s business.” Id. “Maintaining equipment is
meaningfully different from—as only ancillary to—the actual producing, storing, and furnishing
to customers of what the business offers.” Id. The Federal Circuit stated this in the context of a
contract which provided examples of “basic maintenance activities” as follows:
physical switching of a toggle switch; power cycling equipment ... ;
remote visual observations and/or verbal reports to Google on its
specific collocation [sic] cabinet(s) for environment status, display
lights, or terminal display information; labeling and dress-up of
cabling within cabinet; tightening screws, cable ties, or securing
cabling to mechanical connections, plug[s]; replacing existing plugin only hardware such as circuit cards with spares or upgrades.
In re Google, 949 F.3d at 1346 (quoting In re Google LLC Exhibit B at 5).
Plaintiffs argue that the facts here are different as Netflix “maintains significant control
over both the installation and continued operation of the OCAs,” asserting that “the ISPs do much
more than simply install and perform routine maintenance on Netflix’s OCA servers. They work
closely together as partners with Netflix to conduct Netflix’s business of streaming video content
to subscribers in this District.” Dkt. No. 51 at 17. Plaintiffs assert that Netflix explains it is
“important to be able to work with those ISPs in a direct and collaborative way.” Id. (quoting Dkt.
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No. 51-1). Plaintiffs contend the collaborative nature of Netflix’s relationship with the ISPs is aptly
described in the Open Connect Deployment Guide, which refers to the ISPs as Netflix’s “partners”
no less than forty-eight times and repeatedly states they “work closely” with Netflix. Id. at 17–18
(citing Dkt. No. 51-2 at 2 (“This article summarizes what partners can expect during the
deployment process for embedded OCAs.”), 7 (“Your team members will work closely with the
corresponding members of the Netflix team to facilitate the overall process.”)).
Plaintiffs contend that unlike the “one-time event[s]” that “do[] not constitute the conduct
of a ‘regular and established’ business” in In re Google, Defendant’s ISP partners help Defendant
operate the OCAs and control how they deliver content to Netflix’s subscribers. Id. at 18 (quoting
In re Google LLC, 949 F.3d at 1346). Plaintiffs cite the Open Connect Deployment Guide, which
explains: “the manner in which traffic is directed to the appliance is determined explicitly by you
[the ISP] and Netflix, not by the appliance itself” and “OCA only serves clients at IP addresses
that you advertise to the OCA via a BGP session. In other words, traffic is only delivered from
your embedded OCAs to the customer prefixes that you explicitly announce to them.” Id. (citing
Dkt. No. 51-2).
Plaintiffs also assert that, unlike In re Google, Defendant requires ISPs to have several
personnel available to carry out tasks that Defendant may assign, including “a 24/7 contact who
can escalate critical issues in a timely fashion.” Id. (quoting Dkt. No. 51-2 at 13). Plaintiffs further
cite to the Open Connect Deployment Guide which requires ISP partners to “identify a person or
a set of people who are available to perform” specific roles for Defendant at the ISP to “facilitate
the overall process” of delivering streaming video to Netflix customers.” Id. (quoting Dkt. No. 514 at 1). Plaintiffs include, in their response, the following table from the Open Connect Deployment
Guide:
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Id. at 19; Dkt. No. 51-2 at 8. This table indicates that it is required for an ISP to identify a person
or set of people available to perform these roles to participate in the OCA program and that “[y]our
team members will work closely with the corresponding members of the Netflix team to facilitate
the overall process.” Id.
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Defendant replies that these facts merely mirror In re Google. Dkt. No. 57 at 4. Defendant
argues “[t]hese are the same conditions and activities that the Federal Circuit already found
insufficient to establish that an ISP was an agent of a defendant.” Id. at 5.
In fact, the Federal Circuit distinguished the “basic maintenance activities” laid out in
contracts in In re Google from other activities: “[m]aintaining equipment is meaningfully different
from—as only ancillary to—the actual producing, storing, and furnishing to customers of what the
business offers.” In re Google LLC, 949 F.3d at 1346. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s deposition
confirms that Defendant’s ISP partners work closely with Netflix to both store and furnish to
customers Netflix content. Dkt. No. 51 at 19–20 (citing Dkt. No. 51-10 at 96:9–11 (“Q What is
Netflix's definition of an OCA? A An Open Connect appliance is a piece of hardware that stores
and delivers Netflix content.”) (emphasis added)).
Upon examination of the “Team Roles” table from the Open Connect Deployment Guide,
some of the required activities are the sort of basic maintenance activities addressed in In re
Google. The Logistics Representative and Data Center Operations roles perform tasks related to
the sort of one-time installation event described in In re Google. See Dkt. No. 51-2 at 8. Further,
the Network Engineer performs maintenance as described in In re Google. See Id.
However, the Network Engineer also “provides information about partner sites, OCA
configurations . . . and network routing.” Id. The Legal Representative performs work that is not
necessary for operation of the OCAs, but rather is a requirement by Defendant that ISPs must meet
to use the OCAs at all. Id. Most notably, the Engagement Manager and Network Operations are
“[t]he main point of contact for the Netflix Open Connect Partner Engagement Manager (PEM)”
and “[w]orks with Netflix to troubleshoot routing and other configuration issues that might arise.”
Id.
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Troubleshooting goes above and beyond mere maintenance. The Network Operations role
does not merely conduct “physical switching of a toggle switch; power cycling equipment . . . ;
remote visual observations . . . ; labeling . . . ; tightening screws, cable ties, or securing cabling to
mechanical connections, plug[s]; replacing existing plug-in only hardware . . .” as discussed in In
re Google, but rather “[w]orks with Netflix to troubleshoot.” See In re Google LLC, 949 F.3d at
1346; see also Dkt. No. 51-2 at 8.
Finally, basic maintenance activities do not foreclose agency, but rather “standing alone”
are not considered the conduct of Defendant’s business. See In re Google LLC, 949 F.3d at 1346.
Rather, “the maintenance provision, like the provision on installation, may be suggestive of an
agency relationship . . . .” Id. Here, the maintenance and installation roles do not stand alone, but
rather alongside a troubleshooter, a legal representative, and human communications to “work
closely with the corresponding members of the Netflix team” “in a direct and collaborative way”
so that Defendant can “constantly measure and analyze performance and augment capacity as
requirements evolve” for OCAs to “store[] and deliver[] Netflix content” See Dkt. No. 51-2 at 8;
Dkt. No. 51-1; Dkt. No. 51-1 at 3; Dkt. No. 51-10 at 96:9–11 (emphasis added). Examined in its
totality, the Court finds it clear that the ISPs are acting as Defendant’s agents, and accordingly,
recommends that venue in the above-captioned matter is proper and Defendant’s Motion should
be denied with respect to the improper venue argument.
D. Transfer
Defendant’s Motion also argues that the above-captioned matter should be transferred to
the Northern District of California because of a “stark contrast in relevance, convenience, and
fairness” between the Northern District of California and this District. Dkt. No. 26 at 18 (quoting
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In re Nintendo Co., Ltd., 589 F.3d 1194, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). There is no dispute that this case
could have been brought in the Northern District of California. Dkt. No. 51 at 20.
Accordingly, the question is whether the “public and private factors relating to the
convenience of parties and witnesses as well as the interests of particular venues” demonstrate that
N.D. Cal. is clearly more convenient than this District. See Good Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. Broadcom
Ltd., No. 2:16-cv-00134-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 750290, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2017). It is the
Defendant’s burden to prove that the transferee venue is “clearly more convenient” than the
transferor venue. In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d at 315 (“[W]hen the transferee venue
is not clearly more convenient than the venue chosen by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's choice should
be respected. When the movant demonstrates that the transferee venue is clearly more convenient,
however, it has shown good cause and the district court should therefore grant the transfer.”)
The private-interest factors include “(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof, (2)
the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of
attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. The public-interest factors include: “(1) the administrative
difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests
decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4)
the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws.” Id.
1. Relative Ease of Access to Sources of Proof
“In patent infringement cases, the bulk of the relevant evidence usually comes from the
accused infringer. Consequently, the place where the defendant’s documents are kept weighs in
favor of transfer to that location.” Deep Green Wireless LLC v. Ooma, Inc., 2017 WL 679643, at
*2 (citing In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009)) (quotations omitted).

20

Case 2:21-cv-00080-JRG-RSP Document 110 Filed 09/27/21 Page 21 of 34 PageID #: 2335

Defendant argues that “all of the documentary evidence that might be relevant to the
accused products is in the Northern District of California.” Dkt. No. 26 at 24 (citing Dkt. No. 2613 at ¶ 6–7). Defendant asserts that, to the extent it becomes relevant, Defendant’s financial
information is in the Los Gatos office and Defendant does not maintain any documentation in this
District. Id. at 24–25 (citing Dkt. No. 26-13 at ¶ 6–7). Defendant also contends that Docker, Inc.,
a third-party company headquartered in the Northern District of California, may have potentially
relevant evidence as it is the company that provides the open-source code for the software
containers on which Defendant’s streaming service relies. Id. at 25. Finally, Defendant asserts that
Plaintiffs’ presence in the Northern District of California, as subsidiaries of Broadcom, Inc., which
is headquartered in San Jose, significantly outweigh its presence in the Eastern District of Texas.
Id.
Plaintiffs respond that a “movant ‘is required to identify specific evidence in the record
and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim.’” Dkt. No.
51 at 20 (quoting Hammers v. Mayea-Chang, No. 2:19-cv-00181-JRG, 2019 WL 6728446, at *5
(E.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2019) (citation omitted)). Further, “venue analysis is concerned only with the
presentation of evidence at and during trial.” Seven Networks, LLC, 2018 WL 4026760, at *3 n.4;
see also AGIS Software Dev. LLC v. Huawei Device USA Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00513-JRG, 2018 WL
2329752, at *3 (E.D. Tex. May 23, 2018) (“[T]he inquiry regarding access to sources of proof
correlates to production and presentation to the jury at trial.”).
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant has cited to no specific evidence in that district, “much less
specific evidence that it expects to use at trial.” Id. at 21. Plaintiffs contend that merely stating that
unidentified documents that “might be relevant” are allegedly maintained in the Northern District
of California does not support transfer. Id. (citing Invitrogen Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 6:08-cv-
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00113, 2009 WL 331889, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2009)). As stated in Invitrogen Corp., “other
than generally referring to documents, they have not identified any specific evidence, physical or
otherwise. These general statements fail to show that transfer would make access to sources of
proof either more or less convenient for the parties.” Invitrogen Corp., 2009 WL 331889, at *3.
With regards to third-party Docker, Plaintiffs point out that the issue is not whether Docker
might have potentially relevant evidence but whether it has specific evidence that will likely be
needed at trial, which Defendant has not identified. Dkt. No. 51 at 21. Plaintiffs respond that
although Defendant generally refers to “open source code,” open-source code is, by definition,
available to anyone, anywhere. Id. Further, during the deposition about the relevance of Docker to
this case, Defendant’s corporate representative refused to answer based on privilege:
Q. And do you – what relevance does Docker have to this case? MS.
HASSELBERG: Objection, form. MR. JACOB: Instruct not to
answer except for communications you know through
communications other than your attorneys. A. I can’t answer.
Id. at 21–22 (quoting Dkt. No. 51-10 at 63:24–64:5). Defendant should not be allowed to rely on
evidence that it has shielded from discovery based on privilege.
Plaintiffs point to specific evidence that they assert is relevant to this matter. Id. at 22–24.
Plaintiffs cite to contracts with at least six ISP partners in this District that store and deliver Netflix
content to Netflix subscribers within the District and Defendant’s agreements with Amazon Web
Services. Id. Plaintiffs argue that the ISP partners have “information documenting the amount of
content that Netflix streams to subscribers through its OCAs in this District, which is relevant to
determining both the extent and the value of Netflix’s infringing activity.” Id. at 22 (citing Dkt.
No. 51-14). Plaintiffs further argue that Amazon Web Services documents are relevant because
much of the accused functionality is implemented on hardware and services provided by AWS
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under its agreements with Defendant, including the Netflix Titus system and alleged infringement
of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,402,098 and 10,911,938. Id. at 23–24 (citing Dkt. No. 51-35).
Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant provides OCAs at Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) that
indirectly connect to ISP servers to receive data. Dkt. No. 51 at 23. Plaintiffs assert there are three
IXPs in Texas: Equinix, Inc. and Midsouth U.S. Internet Exchange, Inc. a/k/a MUS-IX in Dallas,
and CyrusOne Internet Exchange in Houston. Plaintiffs show that these IXPs have “relevant
information documenting the amount of content that Netflix streams to subscribers in this District,”
but does not identify more specific evidence. Id.
Defendant replies reiterating that the bulk of relevant evidence in a patent case comes from
the accused infringer, and as Defendant asserts all source code and other documentation is located
in Los Gatos, “regardless of what evidence will be at issue in this case, it will be collected from
Los Gatos.” Dkt. No. 57 at 10 (citing Lifetstyle Sols., Inc. v. Abbyson living LLC, 2017 WL 525006,
at *3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2017)). The Court finds that a blanket argument that most relevant
evidence will come from an accused infringer and that allegedly all documentation of the accused
infringer is in another district is insufficient to meet the requirement that Defendant identify
relevant evidence in the transferee district in the face of Plaintiffs’ showing regarding relevant
evidence in the transferor district.
Defendant has failed to identify any specific evidence in the record and articulate the
precise way that evidence supports its claim. Plaintiff, however, has done so in identifying the
agreements between Defendant and at least six ISP partners in this district as well as the
agreements between Defendant and Amazon Web Services. Accordingly, the Court finds this
factor weighs somewhat against transfer.
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2. Availability of Compulsory Process
Defendant has identified thirteen third-party witnesses: six prosecuting attorneys, four
alleged prior-art inventors, and three former employees in the Northern District of California. Dkt.
No. 21–23. Further, Defendant argues that “to the extent Netflix is required to compel testimony
from employees of Docker, Inc. … . Docker is headquartered in the Northern District of
California.” Id. at 23.
Plaintiffs respond that “for the Court to meaningfully assess the weight that should be
attached to a third-party witness, it is incumbent upon the advancing party to demonstrate the
likelihood of that witness actually testifying at trial.” Dkt. No. 51 at 25 (quoting Realtime Data
LLC v. Dropbox, Inc., No. 6:15-cv-00465-RWS-JDL, 2016 WL 153860, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 12,
2016)). Plaintiffs argue that Defendant has not contended that the thirteen third-party witnesses
will be likely to be called to testify at trial and counters that the information most of them allegedly
have is not relevant to any issue in this case because Defendant filed a declaratory-judgment action
against CA in the Northern District of California seeking a non-infringement judgment, but not
invalidity. Id. at 25–26 (citing Netflix, Inc., Dkt. No. 1 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2021)).
The Court disagrees with the logical jump that Plaintiffs attempt: that failing to seek
invalidity in another action means Defendant does not consider that issue relevant in this separate
action. However, Defendant has here failed to specifically allege why their testimony is important
or provide any information regarding the likelihood that their knowledge is material to the issues
that will be tried. See Alacritech Inc. v. CenturyLink, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00693-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL
4155236, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2017) (“The Court discounts these prior-art witnesses because
Defendants have failed to specifically allege why their testimony is important.”); Kranos IP Corp.
v. Riddell, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00443-JRG, 2017 WL 3704762, at *12 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2017)
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(“Without further information with respect to the likelihood that any of these prosecuting attorneys
should testify, the Court does not give weight to these arguments.”).
Plaintiffs identify specific third-party witnesses who live in or near this District and allege
why their testimony is important. Dkt. No. 51 at 27–28. First, Plaintiffs argue that specific ISP
personnel Derek Davidson, Matt Tucker, Clint Cook, and Matt LaRoy have technical information
about establishing and maintaining the peering connections between the ISP-based OCAs and
OCAs at Netflix’s IXP locations used for content-fill operations accused of infringement. Id. at
27. Second, Plaintiffs argue that Byron Hicks and Peter Macmillan, based in Dallas, have relevant
information concerning peering connections used for the accused content-fill operations between
IXP-located OCAs and OCAs at Netflix’s ISP partners. Id. Plaintiffs also identify Karen Stoker,
who is referenced in Defendant’s agreements with CyrusOne as the “Subject Matter Expert.” Id.
Third, Plaintiffs identify Sean Shriver, an AWS employee in Dallas, as a NoSQL Solutions
Architect and a leading expert on the AWS DynamoDB database. This is relevant because
Defendant uses the DynamoDB to support its A/B testing process to evaluate and update its
“adaptive streaming and content delivery network algorithms” and CA has accused Netflix’s A/B
testing process of infringement. Id. at 27–28 (citing Dkt. No. 51-19). Plaintiffs show that each of
these witnesses, including those who reside just outside of this District, is subject to the Court’s
subpoena power and could be called to trial. Id. at 28.
Defendant replies that Plaintiffs “try to minimize” the relevance of Defendant’s identified
third party witnesses “and manufacture their own.” Dkt. No. 57 at 9. Defendant argues that the
potential third-party witnesses include Defendant’s former employees who authored articles cited
in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, attorneys who prosecuted the asserted patents, and prior art inventors,
and that “[t]hese witnesses clearly have information relevant to the allegations of the Complaint,
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invalidity, and prosecution of the asserted patents.” While it is certainly not dispositive of their
relevance, the Court has observed across scores of patent jury trials that prosecuting attorneys
almost never testify, partly due to privilege issues but mainly because they have little relevant
knowledge not more easily obtained from other sources. As for the named inventors, Plaintiffs
cast serious doubt on Defendant’s representation that four of them actually reside in N.D. Cal.
Dkt. No. 51 at 31-32.
Simply stating that these witnesses “clearly have information relevant” does not meet
Defendant’s burden to specifically allege how their testimony is important. Here, as with the ease
of access to sources of proof factor, Plaintiffs have identified specific third-party witnesses and
specifically shown why the testimony is important. Defendant has identified specific third-party
witnesses but has not shown how their testimony is important. This factor weighs slightly against
transfer.
3. Cost of Attendance for Willing Witnesses
This factor is intended to be a separate factor but the arguments in this case tend to conflate
this factor with the last one. “The convenience of the witnesses is probably the single most
important factor in a transfer analysis.” Deep Green, 2017 WL 679643, at *4 (quoting In re
Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338 at 1342). The location of third-party witnesses “weighs heavily
for transfer.” Good Kaisha v. Xilinix, Inc., 2017 WL 4076052, at *4 (citing In re Apple, Inc., 581
F. App’x 886, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Defendant identifies twenty-one employees with potentially
relevant information based on Plaintiffs’ Complaint; Renee Rodriguez, Netflix’s Vice President;
four of the twelve inventors of the asserted patents; and thirteen third-party witnesses, all in the
Northern District of California. Dkt. No. 26 at 19–21.
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Plaintiffs argue that there is no reason for Defendant to assume the alleged prior-art and
patent-prosecution witnesses would be willing witnesses under this factor, and that Netflix cannot
“double-dip” by counting those individuals under both factors. Dkt. No. 51 at 29 (citing AGIS
Software Dev. LLC, 2018 WL 2329752, at *3 (“It is common to see parties attempt to have this
Court double- or triple-count witnesses for purposes of evaluating the convenience of a forum …
These factors do not permit a single source of proof or witness to be ‘double counted’ or unduly
influence the analysis.”)).
Plaintiffs contend that as to Defendant’s employees, “it is the convenience of non-party
witnesses, rather than of party witnesses, that is more important and accorded greater weight in a
transfer of venue analysis.” Id. (quoting Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. v. Medallion Foods, Inc., 867 F.
Supp. 2d 859, 870–71 (E.D. Tex. 2012) (citation omitted)). Plaintiffs point out that Netflix does
not state that it will likely call any of them at trial but simply says that they have “potentially
relevant information.” Id. (quoting Dkt. No. 26 at 19–20).
Plaintiffs further show that Defendant has “numerous engineers and other employees in
Texas and in the Eastern District of Texas with relevant knowledge about the accused Netflix
systems and services” that Defendant’s Motion fails to mention, and that courts have cautioned
against this kind of venue-fact shading, noting that a party “cannot simply ‘cherry-pick’ witnesses
to present one venue as more convenient than another.” Dkt. No. 51 at 30 (quoting CloudofChange,
LLC v. NCR Corp., No. 6:19-cv-513, 2020 WL 6439178, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2020)).
Plaintiffs then name seven of Defendants’ employees living in this District “who appear to have
relevant information . . . .” Id.
More specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Brady Walsh is “an Austin-based specialist focusing
on Netflix’s accused Open Connect CDN” and that “Mr. Walsh appears to be one of the Netflix
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employees most knowledgeable about the accused Open Connect network. Netflix’s own
presentation materials identify him as the first of five ‘OpenConnect Contact[s].’” Id. at 30–31.
Plaintiffs also argue that Steve Urban, a Netflix Remote Engineering Leader based in Austin, is
Netflix’s leading expert on A/B testing, and that because Netflix uses A/B testing as part of its
infringement, Mr. Urban has knowledge of relevant information and is a likely witness. Id. at 31.
Plaintiffs then name several other Texas-based Netflix employees.
Defendant replies that Defendant does not have to show that every witness identified in its
motion is likely to testify at trial, as “The court should consider all potential material and relevant
witnesses, regardless of the likelihood of their being called to testify at trial.” Dkt. No. 57 at 7
(quoting Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. Xilinx, Inc., 2017 WL 4076052, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 14,
2017) (citing In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338 at 1343 (“Requiring a defendant to show that
the potential witness has more than relevant and material information at this point in the litigation
or risk facing denial of transfer on that basis is unnecessary.”)). Defendant is correct that the Court
should consider all potential material and relevant witnesses, even without a showing of the
likelihood of being called to testify at trial. But that does not contradict or change that a “movant
‘is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which
that evidence supports his or her claim.’” Hammers, 2019 WL 6728446, at *5. For the Court to
meaningfully evaluate the relative convenience of different places of trial, the Court must
understand whether a potential witness has knowledge that is material to the issues that will be
disputed at the trial.
The Court considers the witnesses that Defendant points to for this factor. More
importantly and accorded greater weight than party employees “is the convenience of non-party
witnesses.” Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 2d at 870–71. Defendant has identified thirteen

28

Case 2:21-cv-00080-JRG-RSP Document 110 Filed 09/27/21 Page 29 of 34 PageID #: 2343

third-party witnesses. Dkt. No. 26 at 20–21. Plaintiffs have identified eight and have specifically
shown why these witnesses are likely to testify at trial. Dkt. No. 51 at 27–28. These thirteen and
eight were both identified in the previous factor and should not be double counted. See AGIS
Software Dev. LLC, 2018 WL 2329752, at *3. Both parties name several of Defendants’ employees
in both the Northern District of California and the Eastern District of Texas. Considering all of the
foregoing, the Court finds that this factor is neutral.
4. Practical Problems
“Practical problems include those that are rationally based on judicial economy.
Particularly the existence of duplicative suits involving the same or similar issues may create
practical difficulties that will weigh heavily in favor of transfer.” Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
2017 WL 11553227, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2017); see also J2 Glob. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Protus
IP Sols., Inc., 2008 WL 5378010, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2008). Defendant argues that judicial
economy favors transfer because there is another case pending in the Northern District of
California involving related plaintiffs, the same defendant, and the same accused products. Dkt.
No. 26 at 26–27 (citing “Case No. 8:20-cv-00529”).
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s argument regarding the case pending in the Northern
District of California is faulty because “[t]hat case however, involves different plaintiffs, different
patents, different claims and claim terms, different prior art, different infringement contentions,
and different accused technology. ‘Put simply, the two cases will be decided on entirely different
evidence and different legal theories.’” Dkt. No. 51 at 33 (quoting Allergan Sales, 2016 WL
8201783, at *2). Plaintiffs further argue that Judge Donato agrees because after Defendant filed
its declaratory judgment action against Plaintiffs in the Northern District of California for the
patents asserted here and moved to consolidate that case with the aforementioned action pending
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before Judge Donato, Judge Donato rejected Defendant’s argument that the cases were related and
denied Defendant’s Motion. Id. (citing Broadcom Corp. v. Netflix, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-4677–JD,
Dkt. No. 125 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2021)).
Defendant replies that there are now two pending cases in the Northern District of
California that involve overlapping parties and technology, and accordingly this factor “weighs at
least slightly in favor of transfer.” Dkt. No. 57 at 11. Although Judge Donato has already found
those two cases are not sufficiently related to warrant case consolidation, no such finding has been
made with respect to the present case and each of the two cases pending in the Northern District
of California. See Broadcom Corp. v. Netflix, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-4677–JD, Dkt. No. 125 (N.D. Cal.
June 8, 2021). Plaintiffs admit one of those cases is a declaratory judgment action against Plaintiffs
for the patents asserted here. Dkt. No. 51 at 33 (citing Broadcom Corp. v. Netflix, Inc., No. 3:20cv-4677-JD, Dkt. No. 125 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2021)). Minimal judicial economy may be created
by transfer with respect to the commonality of patents and noninfringement argument.
However, Plaintiffs also argue that “the two cases will be decided on entirely different
evidence and different legal theories.” Dkt. No. 51 at 33 (quoting Allergan Sales, 2016 WL
8201783, at *2). For example, as discussed in other factors, Defendant has pointed to prior art
witnesses and prosecuting attorneys as part of its convenience transfer motion. Such witnesses
regard the invalidity defense, which Plaintiffs assert Defendant did not seek judgment on in its
declaratory judgment action. Dkt. No. 51 at 25–26. Defendant does not challenge this assertion.
Accordingly, if transfer were granted, either the declaratory judgment action would need to be
expanded to include new legal issues that are not being litigated, or the cases would not be
consolidated and any efficiency would be lost, replaced by the inefficiency of starting this matter
over in a new district. Furthermore, Defendant’s filing of a declaratory judgment action months
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after this action was filed, and just three days before its transfer motion, is the very type of
procedural maneuvering that cannot influence a venue analysis. Considering all facts, the Court
finds this factor is neutral.
5. Administrative Difficulties from Court Congestion
Defendant argues that the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion are
neutral because the difference in time to trial—17.7 months for the Eastern District of Texas and
22 months for the Northern District of California—is “negligible.” Dkt. No. 26 at 28–29. Plaintiffs
reply that Defendant admits that time to trial is shorter here than in the Northern District of
California and that Defendant’s argument that this factor is neutral is contrary to previous findings
in this Court that the shorter time to trial weighs against transfer. Dkt. No. 51 at 34 (citing Uniloc
USA, Inc., 2017 WL 11553227 at *9 (holding this factor weighed against transfer because the
“median time to trial in this District is several months faster than the Northern District of
California”)). Plaintiffs further argue that the unrelated case pending in Judge Donato’s court was
transferred to the Northern District on July 10, 2020, and “[n]ow, over a year later, the court has
not even entered a scheduling order, no date has been set for a Markman hearing, and there is no
trial date. Without question, this case will proceed more expeditiously here than in the Northern
District.” Id. (citing Dkt. Nos. 51-35; 51-34).
Defendant replies that this District’s faster time to trial is “marginal” and that it “cannot
outweigh all of the other factors.” Dkt. No. 57 at 11 (citing In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338
at 1347). Defendant is correct that, if “all the other factors” weighed against it, the court congestion
factor alone would not outweigh all of them. However, the Court finds this factor itself weighs
against transfer.
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6. Local Interest
Defendant argues that the Northern District of California has a greater interest in this
dispute because Defendant and Plaintiffs’ parent company are headquartered in that district, nearly
half of the inventors and some of the patent prosecutors are located in that district, and the accused
products are designed, developed, and managed in that district. Dkt. No. 26 at 28. Plaintiffs argue
that Defendant acknowledges, however, that CA, Inc. maintains an office in this District. Dkt. No.
51 at 34.
Plaintiffs argue that over 3.16 million adults live in the Eastern District of Texas and 52%
of United States adults had a Netflix subscription and it can be estimated that Defendant has more
than 1.5 million subscribers in this District. Dkt. No. 51 at 35 (citing Dkt. Nos. 51-35; 51-36).
Plaintiffs further argue that Netflix paid over $200 million in sales tax to the State of Texas from
August 11, 2016, through August 11, 2020, and the scale of Netflix’s business and allegedly
infringing activities here give this Court a substantial interest in resolving the case. Id. at 35–36
(citing Dkt. No.51-15; Network-1 Sec. Sols., Inc. v. D-Link Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 795, 801 (E.D.
Tex. 2006)).
Plaintiffs further argue Defendant’s analogy to national sales of an accused product is
improper since “Netflix has taken specific actions to install its accused Open Connect CDN in this
District . . . . [h]aving made the business decision to implement its accused Open Connect CDN in
the Eastern District of Texas . . . Netflix cannot now disavow the local interests.” Id. at 36–37
(citing Dkt. Nos. 51-10; 51-1).
Defendant replies that Plaintiffs’ argument regarding a local interest based on Netflix
subscribers has been squarely rejected by the Federal Circuit because “the fact that infringement
is alleged here ‘gives [this] venue no more of a local interest than the Northern District of
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California or any other venue.’” Dkt. No. 57 at 11 (citing In re Samsung Elecs. Co., 2021 WL
2672136, at *7 (Fed. Cir. June 30, 2021)). Defendant is correct that the infringement allegation
gives this venue no more local interest than any other venue. “[T]he sale of an accused product
offered nationwide does not give rise to a substantial interest in any single venue . . . .” In re
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 587 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
However, Plaintiffs’ argument is not solely regarding infringement allegations. Rather,
Plaintiffs argue that “Netflix is in the business of providing video content to subscribers here.
Indeed, that business is significant.” Dkt. No. 51 at 34–35. Plaintiffs’ two arguments are plainly
stated together: “[b]oth the scale of Netflix’s business and its infringing activities here give this
Court a substantial interest in resolving this case.” Id. at 36 (citing Network-1 Sec. Sols., Inc., 433
F. Supp. 2d at 801). Plaintiffs have properly argued a significant scale of business operations in
the Eastern District of Texas.
The Court, in essence, weighs Defendant’s argument that the Northern District of
California has a greater interest because relevant parties are headquartered there, some witnesses
are located there, and the accused products are designed, developed, and managed there against
Plaintiffs’ argument that significant business activities take place in the Eastern District of Texas.
After due consideration, the Court finds these arguments nearly comparable in weight and finds
this factor slightly favors transfer.
7. Familiarity of Forum with Governing Law
Defendant argues that both the Northern District of California and this District are equally
“capable of applying patent law to infringement claims,” and that this factor is therefore neutral.
Dkt. No. 26 at 29 (quoting Glob. Equity Mgmt. (SA) Pty. Ltd. v. Alibaba.com, Inc., 2017 WL
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1109865, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2017)). Plaintiffs agree that this factor is neutral. Dkt. No. 51
at 37.
8. Conflict of Laws
Defendant argues that there are no conflict of law issues implicated by transfer, and thus
this factor is neutral. Dkt. No. 26 at 29. Plaintiffs agree that this factor is neutral.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Most of the factors in the convenience transfer analysis either weigh against transfer or are
neutral. Thus, Defendant has not met its burden to show that the Northern District of California is
“clearly more convenient” than the Eastern District of Texas. See In re Volkswagen of America,
Inc., 545 F.3d at 315. Accordingly, Defendant’s alternative request for a convenience transfer
should also be denied.
It is accordingly recommended that Defendant’s Motion (Dkt. No. 26) be DENIED.
.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the findings, conclusions, and

recommendations contained in this report within 14 days bars that party from de novo review by
the District Judge of those findings, conclusions, and recommendations and, except on grounds of
plain error, from appellate review of unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions accepted
and adopted by the district court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Any objection to this Report and
Recommendation must be filed in ECF under the event “Objection to Report and
Recommendations [cv, respoth]” or it may not be considered by the District Judge.
SIGNED this 3rd day of January, 2012.
SIGNED this 27th day of September, 2021.
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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

